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Monistic and Dualistic Paths 
to  Radical Secularism: 
Comments on Tushnet 
Ralph C. Hancock* 
Parts of Mark Tushnet's essay might provide a useful 
corrective to what he calls a "sky is falling"' response to the 
already infamous Smith2 decision. It is well to be reminded 
that religious claims were more often denied than honored 
under the Supreme Court's "compelling state interest 
d~ctrine,"~ and that religious interests are not entirely without 
legal resources ("various statutory and state constitutional 
 ground^")^ under the new regime. More fundamentally, 
Tushnet reminds us of the illusory character of any tidy legal 
separation between political and religious interests or purposes. 
To maintain boundaries between the state and religion, 
someone (presumably the Supreme Court, conditioned by its 
sense of the "mainstream" of public opinion) must in the end 
decide what qualifies as a "compelling state interest," and 
indeed what qualifies as "religion." 
One might conclude from such observations that respect for 
these boundaries from the political side must ultimately 
depend, not upon some tidy legal dichotomy between "secular" 
and "religious," but upon a general public respect for religion or 
for the purposes served by religion. An inevitable corollary of 
* Associate F'rofessor of Political Science, Brigham Young University. Professor 
Hancock chaired a panel discussion on "Religious Liberty in a Postmodern Age" for 
the Symposium on New Directions in Religious Liberty, Jan. 22-23, 1993, in which 
Professor Tushnet delivered his paper, infra note 1. 
1. Mark Tushnet, The Rhetoric of Free Exercise Discourse, 1993 B.Y.U. L. REV. 
117, 118. 
2. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 US .  872 (1990). 
3. See, e.g., Tushnet, supra note 1, a t  122. 
4. Id. at 123. 
5. See Tushnet's discussion of the "three levels of free exercise law," id. a t  
134. 
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this view-as the founders of Brigham Young University 
learned the hard way-is that public respect tends to be 
limited to the conventionally respectable. 
But these are not Tushnet's conclusions, and his aim is 
certainly not to contribute to the security or scope of religious 
freedom by broadening or informing the public's respect for 
religion. For this would require an articulation of some sense of 
the meaning of "religious" ends as at once distinct from secular 
purposes and as legitimate objects of public protectiod But 
Tushnet is determined not to  know what religion is. 
For Tush.net, religion is always becoming, always in 
process. Religion has no stable meaning, and so we can never 
maintain that religion has been compromised or subjugated. A 
religion may seem to  have succumbed to external, secular 
pressure, but this appearance vanishes when we understand 
that no ground exists for the distinction between the religious 
and the secular. The very definition of "religion," or of any 
particular religion, is a matter of ongoing "dialogue7' and 
"negotiation" between or among historical forces. From this 
point of view, the very concept of coercion vanishes, for there is 
no-thing to coerce; the legitimacy of power cannot be judged 
from the standpoint of any stable religious commitments. State 
coercion is on the same plane with social pressure, and each is 
as entitled as any other force-factor to contribute to the ongoing 
redefinition of "religion," to the "dialogue" and "negotiation" 
through which religion is ever becoming. 
Is religion becoming better? Consistent with his historical 
relativism, Tush.net claims he is unable to pass judgment on 
this matter. Indeed, the question only makes sense in his 
framework as a question about how religion or a religion at 
some future point in the endless flux of dialogic or negotiated 
development might evaluate an earlier point in this process. 
Tush.net insists that he takes "no position on the authenticity 
of either Georgetown's pre- or post-litigation interpretation of 
what its religious commitments require."' But this pose is not 
6. This is no easy task, but Tocqueville has provided a model of how the 
argument, political but not utilitarian, neither dogmatic nor relativistic, might be 
developed. See generally ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, D MOCRACY IN AMERICA (J.P. 
Mayer ed. & George Lawrence trans., 1969). 
7. Tushnet, supra note 1, at 133 n.37. 
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convincing. A theory which reduces religion to the successive 
and contingent products of political bargaining or to the 
outcome of a blind interaction of social forces can hardly claim 
to do justice to, or  even give respect to, a religion's claim to 
represent (however imperfectly) a permanent and transcendent 
truth. If freedom of religion is merely the freedom of another 
"interest group," then there is no point in calling it freedom of 
religion. (Moreover, in a political arena conceived as a contest 
of force-factors where nothing is sacred, there may be cause t o  
worry about the viability of any freedom.) Tushnet invites 
religion to a supposedly fair fight, where all that is distinctive 
in religion must be left at the door, and all remaining weapons 
. can only be taken up in the name of secular interests. 
In any case, Tushnet does not work very hard at 
sustaining this pose of impartiality, but clearly tips his hand in 
a number of passages. Thus he seems to take for granted that 
being forced to  negotiate with secular interests can bring a 
religion to understand what its "commitments really are . . . . 
[Sluch efforts will enhance the institution's religious 
commitments through clarification of those  commitment^."^ 
Although religion is a process of negotiation and dialogue, it is 
apparently possible for the "Enlightened" to  discern when that 
process is moving in the right direction (clarifying "real" 
commitments), and when it is not (clinging to  old-fashioned 
ideas of morality as anchored in transcendent truth). Tushnet's 
feigned impartiality t o  the outcome of struggles to  define a 
particular religion's commitments (e.g., the Catholic church's 
position on the status of homosexuality) is a very thin mask for 
his promotion of a liberationist viewpoint. Pretending not to  
notice that contemporary efforts to "redefine" religious 
commitments have a persistent common theme-the attack on 
traditional moral restraints-he is puzzled as to "why the 
outsider's perspective is relevant.'* 
This question may be framed more bluntly: Why should 
Mormons care about how Catholicism-or a certain jurisdiction 
of Catholicism-redefines itself? The plain answer is that 
Mormons, Catholics, and many others have a common interest 
in resisting government-sponsored encroachments into their 
institutions and ways of life by a radically secular, liberationist 
antiethic. Within the horizon of Tushnet's reduction of religion 
8. Id. at 131. 
9. Id.at132. 
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to the negotiated or coerced transvaluation of values, the 
verdict of history is not hard to read in advance. If his 
collapsing of truth with negotiation and even coercion prevails, 
then it will obviously be impossible to regard Georgetown's new 
accommodation of homosexuals as "unauthentic-a mere 
submission to  coercive state pre~sure."'~ The alternative- 
Tushnet's real view, the view from the perspective of our 
liberated future-is "that we will see the old position as 
unauthentic-resting on a thoughtless failure to consider the 
implications of the church's fundamental commitments and 
faith when approaching problems that were unforeseen by 
those who formulated the old position. . . . a thoughtless 
adherence to a mindless tradition."" For Tushnet, any belief 
that does not understand itself as the contingent result of blind 
social or political forces can only be regarded as irrational or 
"thoughtless." 
For any thoughtless people who may not have been 
sufficiently reassured by Tushnet's monistic reduction of 
religion to  a process of secular evolution, he goes on to supply a 
defense of Smith in the language of radical dualism. On this 
view, the religious and the secular are seen as "two domains of 
life that ought to be kept separate."lz Relying upon "[olne 
reading of James Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance," 
Tushnet defends Smith as consistent with Madison's 
"sectarian" argument that "[tlhe religion . . . of every man must 
be left t o  the conviction and conscience of every man."13 Smith 
puts an end to the "id~latry"'~ of the "compelling state 
interest" regime, in which secular judges presumed to  decide 
what was essential to  a religion. Tushnet's dualism is 
considerably less friendly to religion than Madison's, simply 
because Madison conceived of the legitimate scope of 
government as rather severely restricted by individual rights, 
whereas Tushnet construes rights in such a way as to invite 
the indefinite expansion of the scope of government. Thus, the 
10. Id. at 133. 
11. Id. 
12. Id. at 136. 
13. Id. (quoting JAMES MADISON, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM: A MEMORIAL AND 
REMONSTRANCE 5 (Lincoln & Edmonds 1819)). 
14. Id. at 137-38. 
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good news for believers is not that free exercise will be 
respected, but that it will be violated on nonreligious grounds! 
Here Tushnet's argument is impossible to parody, and it is 
difficult t o  believe that he intends it to  be taken seriously by 
believers in institutional religion. Perhaps he finds it hard to  
conceive that any such "thoughtless" people still exist, at least 
among his audience of legal scholars. Tushnet proposes that 
believers be content to acknowledge the power of secular 
government to regulate religious institutions in any way it 
likes, as long as this power is not confused with religious 
authority.15 Tushnet fearlessly (or heedlessly) pursues this 
argument to  its conclusion: if Smith results in the persecution 
of religion, then this persecution may serve to  remind the 
religious that the territory of the state must ever be distinct 
from the territory of God? Persecution purifies religion, and 
Tushnet's state is ready to help. 
Here we begin to see that Tushnet's monistic argument 
(religion is a dimension of the historical process) and his 
dualistic argument (religion and politics are radically distinct 
realms) are actually two sides of a single, progressive- 
liberationist coin. The privatization of religion, taken to the 
extreme, leaves the believer without any co~ect ion with 
publicly acknowledged meanings; the transcendent to which 
private "conscience" appeals is divorced from the communal 
human reality in which the person lives and breathes. Any 
substance of private belief thus appears groundless and 
evanescent; the only stable content of belief is a belief in 
progress, which can only be defined negatively as the liberation 
from thoughtless restraints. This is the effectual truth of 
Tushnet's reduction of religion to the condition of being "at 
risk."17 
IV. CONCLUSION 
It would be wrong to give Tushnet credit or blame for 
originality in this mobilization of Christian dualism in the 
service of secular progress. It has been three hundred years 
since Locke called Christianity's bluff: 'Your Kingdom is not of 
this world? Fineyou have the 'other world,' we'll take this 
15. Id. 
16. Id. at 139. 
17. Id. 
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one."18 And, although it would be hasty to make Locke, or 
even a Lockean Madison and Jefferson, the sole authors of the 
American understanding of religious freedom, there is no point 
in denying that Locke's argument played a role in the genesis 
of the First Amendment. But this implies all the more reason 
for friends of religious freedom today to reconsider the 
implications of such a radicalization of religious dualism. When 
Christ said, "render unto Caesar," he surely did not mean to 
authorize everything a modern, progressive Caesar might 
command to "render unto Me." 
Tush.net helps friends of religious freedom to see that, in 
facing the challenge of contemporary secularism, they can no 
longer rest content with the Jeffersonian belief, perhaps 
inherited or appropriated from the spirit of Protestant 
Christianity, that "the mind is made free." No doubt in some 
eternal sense this is true. But if freedom is to mean something 
other than the "liberation" of bodily appetites or formless (if 
ultimately conformist) "self-expression," then our children will 
need religious institutions to prepare them to understand such 
higher meanings. Thus, we can no longer take for granted what 
was often only silently assumed by the Founders of our 
religious freedom: that the defense of such freedom implies a 
common and public recognition, not of any particular 
orthodoxy, but of the real ethical difference between higher and 
lower. 
18. See John Locke, Letter Concerning Toleration, reprinted in MARTO 
MONTORUI, JOHN ~ C K E  ON TOLERATION A D THE UNITY OF GOD 7 (1983); Ralph 
C. Hancock, Religion and the Limits of Limited Government, 50 REV. POL. 682, 
683-84 (1988). 
